EBOOK - Physical Layer Security for 6G Networks (Trung Q. Duong & Junqing Zhang) Full
Bảo mật lớp vật lý cho mạng 6G (Trung Q. Dương & Junqing Zhang)
6G networks are expected to provide one-microsecond latency communication with a billion devices competing for resources 1000 times faster than current standards. Increases in network speed, heterogeneity, virtualization, better radio requirements and adaptive communications will place new demands on physical layer security. Moreover, IoT, blockchain, and artificial intelligence are enabling technologies that require rapid data rates, raising a significant burden on the network's physical layer, requiring that security must be attained at a fast pace, and that the network must be resilient to accommodate sudden changes to the configurations or the load.
Physical layer (PHY) security solutions are needed that have the capacity to handle the new demands of 6G networks, whilst protecting those networks against risk factors such as interference, data spoofing, replay attacks, side-channel attacks, jamming, traffic analysis, and cyber-vandalism attacks. This comprehensive book addresses the PHY security challenges and proposes efficient and resilient physical layer security solutions for beyond 5G networks leading to 6G. Several topics have emerged that rely on PHY security in solving real-world network challenges such as ultra-dense networks, adaptive communication, distributed technology, and artificial intelligence.
Physical Layer Security for 6G Networks helps readers understand the expectations of 6G's physical layer security in supporting pervasive and integrated communication networks, AI convergence and utility, and develop better sensing solutions, which go beyond cognitive radio, device-to-device or mm-wave communications.
CONTENTS:
Part I: Fundamental theories of physical layer security 1
1 Learned codes for dependent wiretap channels 3
Karl-Ludwig Besser, Pin-Hsun Lin and Eduard A. Jorswieck
1.1 Introduction 3
1.1.1 State of the art 5
1.1.2 Outline of chapter 9
1.2 Preliminaries 9
1.2.1 System model 9
1.2.2 Reliability and confidentiality 10
1.2.3 Transmissions over multiple blocks in slow two-state
fading 11
1.2.4 General distributions of the channels 14
1.3 Autoencoder-based wiretap code design 17
1.3.1 Problem formulation 17
1.3.2 Feed-forward neural networks 18
1.3.3 Implementation by autoencoders 19
1.4 Numerical assessments 22
1.4.1 Dependent fading channels with a single connectivity 25
1.4.2 Dependent fading channels with multiple connections 27
1.5 Conclusions and future work 30
References 31
2 Physical layer security in the terahertz band 37
Weijun Gao and Chong Han
2.1 Fundamental system model for THz secure communications 38
2.1.1 THz channel model 38
2.1.2 Performance metrics for THz secure communications 42
2.1.3 Challenges of THz physical layer security 44
2.2 Fundamental system model for THz covert communications 45
2.2.1 Hypothesis testing for covert communications 45
2.2.2 Covert outage probability 46
2.2.3 Signal-to-noise-ratio wall 47
viii Physical layer security for 6G networks
2.3 Distance-adaptive molecular absorption peak modulation scheme 50
2.3.1 DA-APM design guideline 51
2.4 Molecular absorption-assisted SIC-free receiver artificial noise
scheme 52
2.4.1 Temporal broadening effect 53
2.4.2 SIC-free receiver AN scheme 55
2.4.3 Eavesdroppable region analysis 57
2.4.4 Waveform parameter design guideline 59
2.5 Widely spaced antenna communications for THz physical
layer security 60
2.5.1 Widely spaced array and beamforming 61
2.5.2 Beamforming design guideline 62
2.6 Conclusion and future directions 64
References 64
3 Eavesdropping attacks for terahertz wireless links 67
Jianjun Ma, Yige Qiao and Houjun Sun
3.1 Introduction 67
3.2 Security performance characterization 68
3.2.1 Blockage 68
3.2.2 Secrecy capacity 69
3.2.3 Backscattering parameter 69
3.2.4 Outage probability 70
3.3 Eavesdropping attacks in indoor terahertz links 70
3.3.1 Attacks in LoS link 70
3.3.2 Attacks in non-LoS link 72
3.4 Eavesdropping attacks in outdoor terahertz links 74
3.4.1 Deterministic evaluation 75
3.4.2 Probabilistic evaluation 77
3.5 Conclusion 78
Acknowledgments 79
References 79
4 Intelligent reflecting surface-aided physical layer security
of wireless communications 83
Tong-Xing Zheng, Xin Chen, Ying Ju, Haoyu Wang,
Chaowen Liu and Limeng Dong
4.1 Introduction 83
4.1.1 Intelligent reflecting surface-aided physical layer security 83
4.1.2 Recent research and evolution of IRS-aided PLS 84
4.1.3 Contributions and organization 87
4.2 IRS-assisted MIMO secure communications 88
4.2.1 System model and problem description 88
4.2.2 Joint active and passive beamforming design 89
Contents ix
4.2.3 Numerical results and discussions 91
4.2.4 Summary 92
4.3 Enhancing PLS using IRS-empowered pattern index modulations 92
4.3.1 System model and problem description 92
4.3.2 PLS-enhancing schemes for IRS-empowered PIMs 95
4.3.3 Numerical results and discussions 96
4.3.4 Summary 96
4.4 IRS-enabled secure integrated sensing and communication
systems 98
4.4.1 System model and problem description 98
4.4.2 Joint active and passive beamforming design 99
4.4.3 Numerical results and discussions 101
4.4.4 Summary 102
4.5 IRS-aided secure communications: a deep reinforcement learning
perspective 102
4.5.1 System model and problem formulation 103
4.5.2 DRL-based scheme 105
4.5.3 Summary 109
4.6 Conclusions and future works 109
References 110
Part II: Authentication using channel features and
hardware impairments 115
5 Intelligent physical layer authentication 117
Yun Ma, He Fang, Xianbin Wang and Li Xu
5.1 Introduction 117
5.2 System model 121
5.3 BPNN-based intelligent physical layer authentication:
a nonparametric method 123
5.3.1 BPNN-based multiple physical layer attribute fusion 124
5.3.2 Adaptive authentication process based on BPNN 128
5.3.3 Simulation results 128
5.4 FL-based intelligent physical layer authentication: a parametric
method 134
5.4.1 FL-based multiple attribute fusion model 134
5.4.2 Multi-dimensional adaptive authentication process 138
5.4.3 Simulation results 141
5.5 Conclusions and future researches 144
References 145
6 Deep learning-enhanced radio frequency fingerprint identification 149
Guanxiong Shen, Junqing Zhang and Alan Marshall
6.1 Introduction 149
6.2 Related work 151
x Physical layer security for 6G networks
6.3 System overview and problem statement 152
6.3.1 System overview 152
6.3.2 Problem statement 153
6.4 System design 153
6.4.1 Signal processing 153
6.4.2 Training data collection and data augmentation 154
6.4.3 Signal representation 154
6.4.4 Neural network 155
6.5 Case study: LoRa-RFFI system 155
6.5.1 LoRa physical layer primer 155
6.5.2 Signal processing 156
6.5.3 Data augmentation 157
6.5.4 Signal representation 159
6.5.5 Neural network 160
6.6 Experimental evaluation 161
6.6.1 Experimental settings 161
6.6.2 Effect of locations 161
6.6.3 Performance in different SNR scenarios 162
6.6.4 Performance of the frequency offset compensation
algorithm 163
6.6.5 Effect of frequency offset compensation on
RFFI performance 164
6.7 Conclusion 165
References 165
7 Radio frequency fingerprint-based wireless device identification 169
Ming Liu, Hui Luo, Xin Wang, Linning Peng and Hua Fu
7.1 Security risks in wireless networks 169
7.2 Radio frequency fingerprint 172
7.2.1 Properties of RF fingerprint 172
7.2.2 Source of RF fingerprint 173
7.2.3 RF fingerprint-based device identification 177
7.2.4 State-of-the-art 179
7.3 Case study: RFF extraction of Bluetooth devices 183
7.4 Deep learning-based device identification 186
7.4.1 CNN-based known device verification 186
7.4.2 Anomaly detection-based unknown device detection 188
7.4.3 Performance evaluation and analysis 191
7.5 Open questions and potential research directions 194
7.5.1 High capacity fingerprint for massive devices 194
7.5.2 Channel-independent fingerprint extraction 195
7.5.3 Security of RF fingerprint 196
Acknowledgments 197
References 197
Contents xi
Part III: Key generation from wireless channels 205
8 Secret key generation from wireless channels 207
Magnus Sandell
8.1 Introduction 207
8.1.1 Secret key rate 208
8.1.2 Key generation 210
8.2 Channel sounding 211
8.2.1 Channel probing 211
8.2.2 Static environments 211
8.2.3 Precoding 212
8.2.4 Reciprocity 214
8.2.5 Frequency-division duplex 214
8.3 Feature extraction 215
8.3.1 RSSI 215
8.3.2 Frequency response 216
8.3.3 Spatial domain 216
8.3.4 Decorrelation 217
8.3.5 Other processing 218
8.4 Channel quantisation 218
8.4.1 Scalar quantisation 218
8.4.2 Vector quantisation 219
8.4.3 Statistical properties 220
8.5 Information reconciliation 221
8.6 Privacy amplification 224
8.7 Multidevice networks 227
8.8 Summary 230
References 230
9 Impact of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces on physical layer key
generation in NextG wireless networks 237
Guyue Li, Lei Hu, Long Jiao, Kai Zeng, Chen Sun and Aiqun Hu
9.1 Introduction 237
9.2 New changes in fundamentals when PKG meets RIS 239
9.2.1 Fundamentals of PKG 239
9.2.2 RIS-involved channel model 239
9.2.3 Implications of RIS-involved channel 240
9.3 RIS-assisted PKG: potential improvements 240
9.3.1 Case I: static environments 241
9.3.2 Case II: wave-blockage environments 251
9.4 RIS-based attacks and countermeasures 256
9.4.1 RIS jamming (RISJ) attack 256
9.4.2 RIS leakage (RISL) attack 262
9.5 Conclusion and future directions 265
Acknowledgments 266
References 266
xii Physical layer security for 6G networks
10 Physical layer key generation for LoRa-enabled networks 271
Huanqi Yang, Zehua Sun and Weitao Xu
10.1 Introduction 271
10.2 Background 272
10.2.1 Primer on LoRa 272
10.2.2 Primer on wireless key generation 275
10.3 Key-generation schemes for LoRa-enabled networks 280
10.3.1 LoRa key-generation scheme in various environments 280
10.3.2 LoRa key generation scheme for COTS LoRaWAN 281
10.3.3 LoRa key-generation scheme using different channel
parameters 284
10.3.4 LoRa key-generation scheme for long-range and highly
mobile scenarios 285
10.4 Conclusion 287
References 287
11 Robust secret key generation from stochastic fading in the presence
of passive and active attackers 291
Arsenia Chorti
11.1 Introduction and chapter organization 291
11.2 General directions for incorporating PLS in 6G 292
11.2.1 Roadmap for incorporating PLS in 6G 293
11.2.2 Robust SKG 295
11.3 SKG reconciliation rates in short blocklengths 298
11.4 Robust SKG against eavesdropping by a nearby attacker 301
11.4.1 Proposed statistical independence metric 302
11.4.2 Reciprocity and mismatch probability 303
11.4.3 Proposed power domain pre-processing 303
11.4.4 Pre-processing using PCA 304
11.5 Man-in-the-middle attacks on SKG and countermeasures 307
11.6 Analysis of denial of service attacks on SKG 309
11.6.1 Optimal power allocation strategies 311
11.6.2 Stackelberg equilibrium with fixed sensing thresholdpth 311
11.7 Novel hybrid SKG-cryptosystems 312
11.7.1 Authenticated encryption using SKG 313
11.7.2 SKG for zero-round-trip time protocols (0-RTT) 315
11.8 Concluding remarks and future perspectives 316
References 318
12 Physical-layer key generation for multi-user massive MIMO
wireless communications 323
Chen Sun, Guyue Li, Hongyi Luo and Aiqun Hu
12.1 Introduction 323
12.2 System model for massive MIMO key generation 325
12.2.1 Traditional secret key generation model 326
12.2.2 Massive MIMO channel model 327
Contents xiii
12.3 General CDR-based key-generation scheme 330
12.3.1 Key-generation scheme based on CDR 330
12.3.2 Secret key rate 332
12.4 Optimization design of CDR-based key generation 333
12.4.1 Design of precoding and receiving directions 334
12.4.2 Design of transmitted power allocation 336
12.5 Security analysis 340
12.6 Numerical result 341
12.7 Conclusions 347
Acknowledgments 348
References 348
Part IV: Applications of physical layer security 351
13 Physical layer security for UAV wireless networks 353
Chenxi Liu, Rui Ma, Jemin Lee and Tony Q.S. Quek
13.1 Introduction 353
13.2 System model 356
13.2.1 Ground-to-UAV channel model 356
13.2.2 Transmission of AN signals 359
13.2.3 Active eavesdropping 359
13.3 Hybrid outage probability analysis 361
13.3.1 Statistics of SINRs 361
13.3.2 Hybrid outage probability 362
13.3.3 Asymptotic analysis of hybrid outage probability 365
13.3.4 Passive eavesdropping 366
13.4 Simulations and numerical analysis 367
13.4.1 Optimal configuration of legitimate system 367
13.4.2 Optimal configuration of eavesdropper 371
13.5 Conclusions and future works 373
References 374
14 Secure communication in mobile edge computing networks with RF
energy harvesting 379
Dac-Binh Ha, Van-Long Nguyen, Van-Truong Truong and Anand Nayyar
14.1 Introduction 380
14.2 Literature review 382
14.3 System channel and model 383
14.3.1 Relay and user selection solution 385
14.3.2 NOMA-based DF relay offloading with
RF EH description 386
14.3.3 Derivation for the joint CDF of SINRs and SNRs 387
14.4 Secrecy performance analysis 388
14.4.1 Preliminaries 389
14.4.2 Existence probability of secrecy capacity analysis 389
xiv Physical layer security for 6G networks
14.4.3 Secrecy outage probability analysis 391
14.4.4 Secrecy performance optimization 392
14.5 Numerical results and discussion 394
14.6 Conclusion and future scope 403
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1 403
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2 404
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3 405
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 4 406
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 5 406
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 6 408
References 408
15 Secure and private localization in 6G networks 413
Stefano Tomasin, Shihao Yan and Robert Malaney
15.1 Location verification 414
15.1.1 Physical-layer-based location verification 414
15.1.2 Machine-learning-based location verification 415
15.1.3 Simultaneous location reporting and verification 418
15.2 Location privacy 419
15.2.1 Location privacy in mobile networks 420
15.2.2 5G and beyond networks 422
15.2.3 Localization techniques 424
15.2.4 Singe-UE privacy using AoA-based localization 426
15.2.5 Singe-UE privacy using RSS-based localization 427
15.2.6 Single-UE privacy using TDoA-based localization 427
15.2.7 Cooperative location-preserving privacy technique 429
15.3 Quantum-enhanced location privacy and authentication 432
References 437
16 Radio frequency informed physical layer security—an augmented
padlock to wireless transmission secrecy 443
Jayakrishnan M. Purushothama, Jiayu Hou, Yuan Ding and Yue Xiao
16.1 What is physical layer wireless security, and why it is important 443
16.2 Broad classification of physical layer wireless security 444
16.3 Directional modulation (DM) 445
16.3.1 A general mathematical description of DM with
reference to conventional transmission 446
16.3.2 Software-centered approaches for DM 449
16.3.3 Hardware-centered approaches for DM 455
16.3.4 Emerging DM techniques for low-cost and
high-efficiency applications 463
16.4 Inter-system benchmarking and other considerations 466
16.4.1 Metrics for DM evaluation 466
16.4.2 DM power efficiency 467
16.5 Conclusion, future perspectives, and other discussions 468
Acknowledgments 469
References 469
Contents xv
17 Physical layer security for non-orthogonal multiple access
toward 6G 477
Na Li and Yuanwei Liu
17.1 Brief review of PLS for NOMA toward 6G 477
17.1.1 NOMA with new modulation: OTFS-NOMA 478
17.1.2 NOMA with new spectrums:
mmWave/THz/VLC-NOMA 478
17.1.3 NOMA with new random access: GF-NOMA 480
17.1.4 NOMA with new schemes: ISAC/BC-NOMA 480
17.1.5 NOMA with RIS: RIS-NOMA 482
17.1.6 Conclusion in open problems and research directions 483
17.2 Motivation 484
17.2.1 RIS-NOMA under external eavesdropping 485
17.2.2 RIS-NOMA under internal eavesdropping 485
17.3 Secure NOMA communication against the external eavesdropper
assisted by STAR-RIS 486
17.3.1 System model and problem formulation 486
17.3.2 Problem formulation and proposed solution 487
17.3.3 Simulation results 491
17.3.4 Conclusion 496
17.4 Heterogeneous internal secrecy for NOMA assisted by RIS 497
17.4.1 System model 497
17.4.2 Problem formulation and derivations 498
17.4.3 Numerical results 502
17.4.4 Conclusion 504
References 504
18 Detecting unpredictable adversaries in the industrial network with
blockchain 511
Vishal Sharma, Aman Kataria, John McAllister, Amie Weedon
and Robert Bennett
18.1 Introduction 511
18.2 Digital warfare and cyber-vandalism 513
18.3 Unpredictable adversaries 514
18.3.1 Zero-click adversaries 514
18.3.2 Challenges in detecting unpredictable adversaries 514
18.4 Attacks by unpredictable adversaries 516
18.5 Validating ICPS workflow using blockchain 517
18.5.1 Entities 517
18.5.2 Model for event validation 519
18.6 Future research trends 522
18.7 Conclusion 523
References 523
xvi Physical layer security for 6G networks
19 Using support vector machines for detecting active spoofing attacks 527
Tiep M. Hoang and Trung Q. Duong
19.1 Introduction 527
19.2 A brief introduction to TC-SVM and SC-SVM 529
19.2.1 The development of typical models 529
19.2.2 Kernel methods 530
19.2.3 Classification based on twin-class SVM 531
19.2.4 Classification based on SC-SVM 534
19.3 Collecting wireless signals and creating/defining features 535
19.3.1 Collecting wireless data 535
19.3.2 Creating features/attributes 536
19.4 Artificial training data 538
19.4.1 ATD for twin-class SVM 538
19.4.2 ATD for single-class SVM 540
19.4.3 ATD normalization/whitening 540
19.5 Numerical results 541
19.5.1 ExaminingT,T, andT0 541
19.5.2 Examining four different kernel functions 542
19.5.3 Receiver operating characteristic curves and
sensitivity-specificity trade-off 543
19.5.4 Examining the impact ofρEandγ 546
19.5.5 Over-fitting problems: the impact ofγ 546
19.6 Conclusions 548
References
Bảo mật lớp vật lý cho mạng 6G (Trung Q. Dương & Junqing Zhang)
6G networks are expected to provide one-microsecond latency communication with a billion devices competing for resources 1000 times faster than current standards. Increases in network speed, heterogeneity, virtualization, better radio requirements and adaptive communications will place new demands on physical layer security. Moreover, IoT, blockchain, and artificial intelligence are enabling technologies that require rapid data rates, raising a significant burden on the network's physical layer, requiring that security must be attained at a fast pace, and that the network must be resilient to accommodate sudden changes to the configurations or the load.
Physical layer (PHY) security solutions are needed that have the capacity to handle the new demands of 6G networks, whilst protecting those networks against risk factors such as interference, data spoofing, replay attacks, side-channel attacks, jamming, traffic analysis, and cyber-vandalism attacks. This comprehensive book addresses the PHY security challenges and proposes efficient and resilient physical layer security solutions for beyond 5G networks leading to 6G. Several topics have emerged that rely on PHY security in solving real-world network challenges such as ultra-dense networks, adaptive communication, distributed technology, and artificial intelligence.
Physical Layer Security for 6G Networks helps readers understand the expectations of 6G's physical layer security in supporting pervasive and integrated communication networks, AI convergence and utility, and develop better sensing solutions, which go beyond cognitive radio, device-to-device or mm-wave communications.
CONTENTS:
Part I: Fundamental theories of physical layer security 1
1 Learned codes for dependent wiretap channels 3
Karl-Ludwig Besser, Pin-Hsun Lin and Eduard A. Jorswieck
1.1 Introduction 3
1.1.1 State of the art 5
1.1.2 Outline of chapter 9
1.2 Preliminaries 9
1.2.1 System model 9
1.2.2 Reliability and confidentiality 10
1.2.3 Transmissions over multiple blocks in slow two-state
fading 11
1.2.4 General distributions of the channels 14
1.3 Autoencoder-based wiretap code design 17
1.3.1 Problem formulation 17
1.3.2 Feed-forward neural networks 18
1.3.3 Implementation by autoencoders 19
1.4 Numerical assessments 22
1.4.1 Dependent fading channels with a single connectivity 25
1.4.2 Dependent fading channels with multiple connections 27
1.5 Conclusions and future work 30
References 31
2 Physical layer security in the terahertz band 37
Weijun Gao and Chong Han
2.1 Fundamental system model for THz secure communications 38
2.1.1 THz channel model 38
2.1.2 Performance metrics for THz secure communications 42
2.1.3 Challenges of THz physical layer security 44
2.2 Fundamental system model for THz covert communications 45
2.2.1 Hypothesis testing for covert communications 45
2.2.2 Covert outage probability 46
2.2.3 Signal-to-noise-ratio wall 47
viii Physical layer security for 6G networks
2.3 Distance-adaptive molecular absorption peak modulation scheme 50
2.3.1 DA-APM design guideline 51
2.4 Molecular absorption-assisted SIC-free receiver artificial noise
scheme 52
2.4.1 Temporal broadening effect 53
2.4.2 SIC-free receiver AN scheme 55
2.4.3 Eavesdroppable region analysis 57
2.4.4 Waveform parameter design guideline 59
2.5 Widely spaced antenna communications for THz physical
layer security 60
2.5.1 Widely spaced array and beamforming 61
2.5.2 Beamforming design guideline 62
2.6 Conclusion and future directions 64
References 64
3 Eavesdropping attacks for terahertz wireless links 67
Jianjun Ma, Yige Qiao and Houjun Sun
3.1 Introduction 67
3.2 Security performance characterization 68
3.2.1 Blockage 68
3.2.2 Secrecy capacity 69
3.2.3 Backscattering parameter 69
3.2.4 Outage probability 70
3.3 Eavesdropping attacks in indoor terahertz links 70
3.3.1 Attacks in LoS link 70
3.3.2 Attacks in non-LoS link 72
3.4 Eavesdropping attacks in outdoor terahertz links 74
3.4.1 Deterministic evaluation 75
3.4.2 Probabilistic evaluation 77
3.5 Conclusion 78
Acknowledgments 79
References 79
4 Intelligent reflecting surface-aided physical layer security
of wireless communications 83
Tong-Xing Zheng, Xin Chen, Ying Ju, Haoyu Wang,
Chaowen Liu and Limeng Dong
4.1 Introduction 83
4.1.1 Intelligent reflecting surface-aided physical layer security 83
4.1.2 Recent research and evolution of IRS-aided PLS 84
4.1.3 Contributions and organization 87
4.2 IRS-assisted MIMO secure communications 88
4.2.1 System model and problem description 88
4.2.2 Joint active and passive beamforming design 89
Contents ix
4.2.3 Numerical results and discussions 91
4.2.4 Summary 92
4.3 Enhancing PLS using IRS-empowered pattern index modulations 92
4.3.1 System model and problem description 92
4.3.2 PLS-enhancing schemes for IRS-empowered PIMs 95
4.3.3 Numerical results and discussions 96
4.3.4 Summary 96
4.4 IRS-enabled secure integrated sensing and communication
systems 98
4.4.1 System model and problem description 98
4.4.2 Joint active and passive beamforming design 99
4.4.3 Numerical results and discussions 101
4.4.4 Summary 102
4.5 IRS-aided secure communications: a deep reinforcement learning
perspective 102
4.5.1 System model and problem formulation 103
4.5.2 DRL-based scheme 105
4.5.3 Summary 109
4.6 Conclusions and future works 109
References 110
Part II: Authentication using channel features and
hardware impairments 115
5 Intelligent physical layer authentication 117
Yun Ma, He Fang, Xianbin Wang and Li Xu
5.1 Introduction 117
5.2 System model 121
5.3 BPNN-based intelligent physical layer authentication:
a nonparametric method 123
5.3.1 BPNN-based multiple physical layer attribute fusion 124
5.3.2 Adaptive authentication process based on BPNN 128
5.3.3 Simulation results 128
5.4 FL-based intelligent physical layer authentication: a parametric
method 134
5.4.1 FL-based multiple attribute fusion model 134
5.4.2 Multi-dimensional adaptive authentication process 138
5.4.3 Simulation results 141
5.5 Conclusions and future researches 144
References 145
6 Deep learning-enhanced radio frequency fingerprint identification 149
Guanxiong Shen, Junqing Zhang and Alan Marshall
6.1 Introduction 149
6.2 Related work 151
x Physical layer security for 6G networks
6.3 System overview and problem statement 152
6.3.1 System overview 152
6.3.2 Problem statement 153
6.4 System design 153
6.4.1 Signal processing 153
6.4.2 Training data collection and data augmentation 154
6.4.3 Signal representation 154
6.4.4 Neural network 155
6.5 Case study: LoRa-RFFI system 155
6.5.1 LoRa physical layer primer 155
6.5.2 Signal processing 156
6.5.3 Data augmentation 157
6.5.4 Signal representation 159
6.5.5 Neural network 160
6.6 Experimental evaluation 161
6.6.1 Experimental settings 161
6.6.2 Effect of locations 161
6.6.3 Performance in different SNR scenarios 162
6.6.4 Performance of the frequency offset compensation
algorithm 163
6.6.5 Effect of frequency offset compensation on
RFFI performance 164
6.7 Conclusion 165
References 165
7 Radio frequency fingerprint-based wireless device identification 169
Ming Liu, Hui Luo, Xin Wang, Linning Peng and Hua Fu
7.1 Security risks in wireless networks 169
7.2 Radio frequency fingerprint 172
7.2.1 Properties of RF fingerprint 172
7.2.2 Source of RF fingerprint 173
7.2.3 RF fingerprint-based device identification 177
7.2.4 State-of-the-art 179
7.3 Case study: RFF extraction of Bluetooth devices 183
7.4 Deep learning-based device identification 186
7.4.1 CNN-based known device verification 186
7.4.2 Anomaly detection-based unknown device detection 188
7.4.3 Performance evaluation and analysis 191
7.5 Open questions and potential research directions 194
7.5.1 High capacity fingerprint for massive devices 194
7.5.2 Channel-independent fingerprint extraction 195
7.5.3 Security of RF fingerprint 196
Acknowledgments 197
References 197
Contents xi
Part III: Key generation from wireless channels 205
8 Secret key generation from wireless channels 207
Magnus Sandell
8.1 Introduction 207
8.1.1 Secret key rate 208
8.1.2 Key generation 210
8.2 Channel sounding 211
8.2.1 Channel probing 211
8.2.2 Static environments 211
8.2.3 Precoding 212
8.2.4 Reciprocity 214
8.2.5 Frequency-division duplex 214
8.3 Feature extraction 215
8.3.1 RSSI 215
8.3.2 Frequency response 216
8.3.3 Spatial domain 216
8.3.4 Decorrelation 217
8.3.5 Other processing 218
8.4 Channel quantisation 218
8.4.1 Scalar quantisation 218
8.4.2 Vector quantisation 219
8.4.3 Statistical properties 220
8.5 Information reconciliation 221
8.6 Privacy amplification 224
8.7 Multidevice networks 227
8.8 Summary 230
References 230
9 Impact of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces on physical layer key
generation in NextG wireless networks 237
Guyue Li, Lei Hu, Long Jiao, Kai Zeng, Chen Sun and Aiqun Hu
9.1 Introduction 237
9.2 New changes in fundamentals when PKG meets RIS 239
9.2.1 Fundamentals of PKG 239
9.2.2 RIS-involved channel model 239
9.2.3 Implications of RIS-involved channel 240
9.3 RIS-assisted PKG: potential improvements 240
9.3.1 Case I: static environments 241
9.3.2 Case II: wave-blockage environments 251
9.4 RIS-based attacks and countermeasures 256
9.4.1 RIS jamming (RISJ) attack 256
9.4.2 RIS leakage (RISL) attack 262
9.5 Conclusion and future directions 265
Acknowledgments 266
References 266
xii Physical layer security for 6G networks
10 Physical layer key generation for LoRa-enabled networks 271
Huanqi Yang, Zehua Sun and Weitao Xu
10.1 Introduction 271
10.2 Background 272
10.2.1 Primer on LoRa 272
10.2.2 Primer on wireless key generation 275
10.3 Key-generation schemes for LoRa-enabled networks 280
10.3.1 LoRa key-generation scheme in various environments 280
10.3.2 LoRa key generation scheme for COTS LoRaWAN 281
10.3.3 LoRa key-generation scheme using different channel
parameters 284
10.3.4 LoRa key-generation scheme for long-range and highly
mobile scenarios 285
10.4 Conclusion 287
References 287
11 Robust secret key generation from stochastic fading in the presence
of passive and active attackers 291
Arsenia Chorti
11.1 Introduction and chapter organization 291
11.2 General directions for incorporating PLS in 6G 292
11.2.1 Roadmap for incorporating PLS in 6G 293
11.2.2 Robust SKG 295
11.3 SKG reconciliation rates in short blocklengths 298
11.4 Robust SKG against eavesdropping by a nearby attacker 301
11.4.1 Proposed statistical independence metric 302
11.4.2 Reciprocity and mismatch probability 303
11.4.3 Proposed power domain pre-processing 303
11.4.4 Pre-processing using PCA 304
11.5 Man-in-the-middle attacks on SKG and countermeasures 307
11.6 Analysis of denial of service attacks on SKG 309
11.6.1 Optimal power allocation strategies 311
11.6.2 Stackelberg equilibrium with fixed sensing thresholdpth 311
11.7 Novel hybrid SKG-cryptosystems 312
11.7.1 Authenticated encryption using SKG 313
11.7.2 SKG for zero-round-trip time protocols (0-RTT) 315
11.8 Concluding remarks and future perspectives 316
References 318
12 Physical-layer key generation for multi-user massive MIMO
wireless communications 323
Chen Sun, Guyue Li, Hongyi Luo and Aiqun Hu
12.1 Introduction 323
12.2 System model for massive MIMO key generation 325
12.2.1 Traditional secret key generation model 326
12.2.2 Massive MIMO channel model 327
Contents xiii
12.3 General CDR-based key-generation scheme 330
12.3.1 Key-generation scheme based on CDR 330
12.3.2 Secret key rate 332
12.4 Optimization design of CDR-based key generation 333
12.4.1 Design of precoding and receiving directions 334
12.4.2 Design of transmitted power allocation 336
12.5 Security analysis 340
12.6 Numerical result 341
12.7 Conclusions 347
Acknowledgments 348
References 348
Part IV: Applications of physical layer security 351
13 Physical layer security for UAV wireless networks 353
Chenxi Liu, Rui Ma, Jemin Lee and Tony Q.S. Quek
13.1 Introduction 353
13.2 System model 356
13.2.1 Ground-to-UAV channel model 356
13.2.2 Transmission of AN signals 359
13.2.3 Active eavesdropping 359
13.3 Hybrid outage probability analysis 361
13.3.1 Statistics of SINRs 361
13.3.2 Hybrid outage probability 362
13.3.3 Asymptotic analysis of hybrid outage probability 365
13.3.4 Passive eavesdropping 366
13.4 Simulations and numerical analysis 367
13.4.1 Optimal configuration of legitimate system 367
13.4.2 Optimal configuration of eavesdropper 371
13.5 Conclusions and future works 373
References 374
14 Secure communication in mobile edge computing networks with RF
energy harvesting 379
Dac-Binh Ha, Van-Long Nguyen, Van-Truong Truong and Anand Nayyar
14.1 Introduction 380
14.2 Literature review 382
14.3 System channel and model 383
14.3.1 Relay and user selection solution 385
14.3.2 NOMA-based DF relay offloading with
RF EH description 386
14.3.3 Derivation for the joint CDF of SINRs and SNRs 387
14.4 Secrecy performance analysis 388
14.4.1 Preliminaries 389
14.4.2 Existence probability of secrecy capacity analysis 389
xiv Physical layer security for 6G networks
14.4.3 Secrecy outage probability analysis 391
14.4.4 Secrecy performance optimization 392
14.5 Numerical results and discussion 394
14.6 Conclusion and future scope 403
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1 403
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2 404
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3 405
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 4 406
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 5 406
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 6 408
References 408
15 Secure and private localization in 6G networks 413
Stefano Tomasin, Shihao Yan and Robert Malaney
15.1 Location verification 414
15.1.1 Physical-layer-based location verification 414
15.1.2 Machine-learning-based location verification 415
15.1.3 Simultaneous location reporting and verification 418
15.2 Location privacy 419
15.2.1 Location privacy in mobile networks 420
15.2.2 5G and beyond networks 422
15.2.3 Localization techniques 424
15.2.4 Singe-UE privacy using AoA-based localization 426
15.2.5 Singe-UE privacy using RSS-based localization 427
15.2.6 Single-UE privacy using TDoA-based localization 427
15.2.7 Cooperative location-preserving privacy technique 429
15.3 Quantum-enhanced location privacy and authentication 432
References 437
16 Radio frequency informed physical layer security—an augmented
padlock to wireless transmission secrecy 443
Jayakrishnan M. Purushothama, Jiayu Hou, Yuan Ding and Yue Xiao
16.1 What is physical layer wireless security, and why it is important 443
16.2 Broad classification of physical layer wireless security 444
16.3 Directional modulation (DM) 445
16.3.1 A general mathematical description of DM with
reference to conventional transmission 446
16.3.2 Software-centered approaches for DM 449
16.3.3 Hardware-centered approaches for DM 455
16.3.4 Emerging DM techniques for low-cost and
high-efficiency applications 463
16.4 Inter-system benchmarking and other considerations 466
16.4.1 Metrics for DM evaluation 466
16.4.2 DM power efficiency 467
16.5 Conclusion, future perspectives, and other discussions 468
Acknowledgments 469
References 469
Contents xv
17 Physical layer security for non-orthogonal multiple access
toward 6G 477
Na Li and Yuanwei Liu
17.1 Brief review of PLS for NOMA toward 6G 477
17.1.1 NOMA with new modulation: OTFS-NOMA 478
17.1.2 NOMA with new spectrums:
mmWave/THz/VLC-NOMA 478
17.1.3 NOMA with new random access: GF-NOMA 480
17.1.4 NOMA with new schemes: ISAC/BC-NOMA 480
17.1.5 NOMA with RIS: RIS-NOMA 482
17.1.6 Conclusion in open problems and research directions 483
17.2 Motivation 484
17.2.1 RIS-NOMA under external eavesdropping 485
17.2.2 RIS-NOMA under internal eavesdropping 485
17.3 Secure NOMA communication against the external eavesdropper
assisted by STAR-RIS 486
17.3.1 System model and problem formulation 486
17.3.2 Problem formulation and proposed solution 487
17.3.3 Simulation results 491
17.3.4 Conclusion 496
17.4 Heterogeneous internal secrecy for NOMA assisted by RIS 497
17.4.1 System model 497
17.4.2 Problem formulation and derivations 498
17.4.3 Numerical results 502
17.4.4 Conclusion 504
References 504
18 Detecting unpredictable adversaries in the industrial network with
blockchain 511
Vishal Sharma, Aman Kataria, John McAllister, Amie Weedon
and Robert Bennett
18.1 Introduction 511
18.2 Digital warfare and cyber-vandalism 513
18.3 Unpredictable adversaries 514
18.3.1 Zero-click adversaries 514
18.3.2 Challenges in detecting unpredictable adversaries 514
18.4 Attacks by unpredictable adversaries 516
18.5 Validating ICPS workflow using blockchain 517
18.5.1 Entities 517
18.5.2 Model for event validation 519
18.6 Future research trends 522
18.7 Conclusion 523
References 523
xvi Physical layer security for 6G networks
19 Using support vector machines for detecting active spoofing attacks 527
Tiep M. Hoang and Trung Q. Duong
19.1 Introduction 527
19.2 A brief introduction to TC-SVM and SC-SVM 529
19.2.1 The development of typical models 529
19.2.2 Kernel methods 530
19.2.3 Classification based on twin-class SVM 531
19.2.4 Classification based on SC-SVM 534
19.3 Collecting wireless signals and creating/defining features 535
19.3.1 Collecting wireless data 535
19.3.2 Creating features/attributes 536
19.4 Artificial training data 538
19.4.1 ATD for twin-class SVM 538
19.4.2 ATD for single-class SVM 540
19.4.3 ATD normalization/whitening 540
19.5 Numerical results 541
19.5.1 ExaminingT,T, andT0 541
19.5.2 Examining four different kernel functions 542
19.5.3 Receiver operating characteristic curves and
sensitivity-specificity trade-off 543
19.5.4 Examining the impact ofρEandγ 546
19.5.5 Over-fitting problems: the impact ofγ 546
19.6 Conclusions 548
References
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